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INTRODUCTION
An essential component in theories of rational choice under uncertainty is the idea that economic agents form beliefs-subjective probabilities over uncertain events (Anscombe & Aumann, 1963; Savage, 1954) . Beliefs are at the heart of empirical research in game theory. The analysis of beliefs is useful in demonstrating and characterizing heterogeneity in a player population and explaining observed play (e.g., Costa-Gomes, Crawford, & Broseta, in press; El-Gamal & Grether, 1995; McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992; Nagel, 1995; Stahl & Wilson, 1994 . Study of the evolution of beliefs over time is useful in characterizing the dynamics of choice in repeated play 1 (e.g., Camerer & Ho, 1999; Crawford, 1995; Fudenberg & Kreps, Duffy and Nagel (1997) , Nagel, Bosch-Domenech, Satora, and Garcia-Monaevo (1999) , and Costa- Gomes et al. (in press ) present further experimental evidence in favor of hierarchical bounded rationality types. The parametric analysis of Wilson (1994, 1995) , Nagel et al. (1999) , and Costa-Gomes et al. (in press ) relies on likelihood-based estimation and testing of parametric mixture models. Mixture models are often used when there is doubt that the underlying population is homogeneous and most commonly incorporate a likelihood-based estimation procedure. Since the number of subpopulations is unknown prior to estimation, one must have a null hypothesis in advance on the behavioral types that are present and that are to be estimated. Moreover, one must model a player's deviation from the mean response of his or her proposed type in order that no player's observed choices will have zero probability. With these two requirements, specification errors are likely to occur.
Unlike mixture model analysis, the histogram analyses of Nagel (1995) and Nagel et al. (1999) avoid the need for a prespecified null hypothesis.
2 Histogram analysis 2 A qualification of that statement is that the choice of bins is rarely independent of the hypotheses. Moreover, it must be noted that histogram analysis is far more limited than the likelihood-based mixture model in that model parameters cannot be rigorously estimated and only very limited hypothesis tests can be conducted. For that reason, Nagel et al. (1999) complement a histogram analysis with a mixture model analysis.
is based on the principle of modes as subpopulations. Whereas the present work relies on the same underlying fundamentals used in histogram analysis, given the trinomial probability structure of the present belief data, the histogram method proves ineffective here and we turn to more rigorous statistical analysis for answers.
In contrast to the above approaches, the work at hand relies on nonparametric analysis of modes in beliefs. This analysis, much like histogram analysis, is based on the premise that sub-populations can be seen best by finding local maxima, or modes, of an estimated probability density function (Gitman & Levine, 1970; Hartigan, 1977) . The identification of modes of a density as a characterization of subpopulations has been used extensively in many fields, from high-energy physics (Good & Gaskins, 1980) and astronomy (Roeder, 1990) to philately (Izenman & Sommer, 1988) .
To find modes in the sample data, we estimate a nonparametric density using kernel density estimates. The modes are then extracted by direct estimation of the gradient of the estimated density function. It is an important statistical question whether an observed mode in a density estimate really arises from a corresponding feature in the assumed underlying density. In other words, one should be concerned not only with the location of modes, but also with their statistical significance. For that purpose, we apply global methods for testing for the number of modes as well as local testing for the statistical significance of individual modes. The smoothed bootstrap (Efron, 1979) provides the basis for our tests.
THEORY
We begin with a general description of the game environment. We then present a model of player heterogeneity and provide an example of a symmetric normal-form game in which the different subpopulations would tend to separate themselves out by choosing different actions.
The Game Environment
Consider a finite, symmetric, two-player game G -(N, A, U) in normal-form, where N={1, 2} is the set of players, A -{1, ..., J} is the set of available actions, and U is the J × J matrix of payoffs for the row player. By symmetry, the transpose of U, U T , is the column player's payoff matrix. We focus on single population settings in which each player is matched with the empirical choice distribution of all other players. The payoff relevant statistic is the probability distribution of the opponent's choices.
A Theory of Player Heterogeneity
Behavioral scientists often wish to make predictions in a variety of settings that can be modeled as one-shot games. If all players were perfectly rational and had identical models of other players' choice distribution, and these models reflected the true choice distribution, then the Nash equilibrium concept would be a salient prediction tool. Relaxing the above assumptions to require only that players maximize their utility given their hypotheses on other players' strategies, one must have a theory on the nature of hypotheses formed by players.
The theory that humans employ finite depths of reasoning has been proposed by several theorists (e.g., Aumann, 1992; Bacharach, 1992; Binmore, 1987; and Stahl, 1993) . In this work, we follow the terminology of level-n theory (Stahl, 1993) . Level-n theory is based on the notion that a player's model of other players is a truncation of an internal simulation of a self-referential problem. Level-n theory would categorize random behavior as level-0 behavior. Similarly, a player who best responds to a prior of random play would be a level-1 player, best response to a prior of level-1 play would be level-2 behavior, and so on. Though we could continue this hierarchy of types indefinitely, the benefits of higher levels decrease and we shall stop with level-3.
3 Level-n theory also allows for Nash behavior. In addition, Stahl and Wilson (1995) postulate a ''worldly'' archetype. This type of player chooses a best response to a prior based on a belief that the population is composed of a mixture of level-0, level-1, and Nash types. Nagel (1995) presented some of the best known evidence for hypothesis formation based on an iterative self-referential process. In her ''guessing games'' (also known as beauty contest games), groups of subjects were repeatedly asked to simultaneously guess a real number in the interval [0, 100] that they believed would be closest to p times the mean. Although the unique Nash equilibrium is the outcome in which all players choose 0, almost 50% of observations were in the neighborhood of either the first or second levels of reasoning. These findings were successfully replicated in median and maximum variations of the guessing game (Duffy & Nagel, 1997) and later in email and newspaper experiments (Nagel et al., 1999) . Wilson (1994, 1995) , Haruvy, Stahl, and Wilson (in press), and CostaGomes et al. (in press) showed that level-n theory has a strong explanatory power in normal-form games. In this article as well, the focus is on normal-form games. However, unlike the above works, the present work focuses on the hypotheses rather than on the actions taken by participants.
As an illustration of the level-n predictions in the settings investigated in this work, consider the following 3 × 3 symmetric normal-form game shown in Fig. 1 .
A level-1 player, due to insufficient reason, would hypothesize that the population is uniformly distributed over the set of actions. The level-1 hypothesis in the above game would therefore be the vector (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), which we will denote by p (1, 0, 0) . In this case, level-2's expected payoff vector would be (48, 85, 51) . Maximizing expected utility, a level-2 player would go with row action B. A Nash player in this example would hypothesize the population distribution (0, 0, 1). This is because row action C is the only action that is optimal given everyone else chooses it as well. Being an equilibrium action in a symmetric game, the best response to the hypothesis that everyone else chooses C is row action C.
EXPERIMENT DESIGN

The Experiments
We study two data sets, 4 with a focus on the second data set. The first data set comes from Stahl and Wilson (1995; hereafter, SW) . The second data set is from an experiment conducted in the summer of 1997. The games in both data sets were 3 × 3 symmetric normal-form games.
In the first experiment, a participant, looking at the decision matrix as a row player, would enter a choice, using an on-screen calculator to assist him or her. The on-screen calculator allowed participants to enter hypotheses about the distribution of choices of other participants. The calculator then returned the expected value to each row choice. The on-screen calculator is of great importance to the analysis at hand as it allows us to extract hypotheses. These hypotheses will be the focus of our analysis.
In the second experiment, each participant was compelled to enter a hypothesis for each game on the distribution of the other participants' choices. Then, the computer would calculate and display hypothetical payoffs for each pure strategy and the row strategy that would yield the player the highest token payoff would be highlighted and chosen by the computer for him or her. In both experiments, each decision matrix was presented on the computer screen once a corresponding button was pressed. Each participant played each of the games on a computer terminal with no feedback until all games had been played.
The amount of time allocated for the players to make choices was 2 min per game in the first experiment and 1.5 min per game in the second experiment. Within the total time allotted, a player could visit and revisit any game, make and revise choices for any game, and make as many hypothetical calculations on an on-screen calculator as time permitted. These features were intended to increase the likelihood that a participant's observed behavior came from a single model of other players. In the first experiment, an average of 0.77 choice revisions was recorded per player per game. In the second experiment, an average of 2.06 revisions was recorded per player per game. This is an indication that players made good use of the option of revising their hypotheses.
In the first experiment, three sessions of the experiment were run with three groups of 22, 15, and 21 participants respectively, for a total of 58 participants. The second experiment consisted of a single session with 22 players. The participants were upper division business, engineering, social science and natural science students at the University of Texas. The average payment per participant was $27.64 for a 2.5 h session in the first experiment and $22.64 for a 1.5 h session in the second experiment.
Each player played the field. In other words, each player was matched not against one other player but rather against the distribution of other all players' choices. Specifically, to determine participant payoffs, after all games were played, we first computed each participant h's ''token earnings'' for each game as U is P i −h , where P i −h denotes the empirical distribution of all participants other than participant h in game i and U is is the payoff vector for the player's chosen strategy s in game i. Token earnings were then translated game-by-game into the percentage chance of winning $2.00 for a given game via the roll of three ten-sided dice, which generated a random number uniformly distributed on [0, 99.9] for each game.
Extensive instructions were given before the start of the experiment to ensure that all participants understood the computer interface and how their payoffs would be determined. Following a training period, each participant was given a screening test designed to ensure the common knowledge among all players that all other players understood the basics of the game. In SW's experiment, 15 symmetric 3 × 3 game matrices were presented to participants. Only five of these games had a separate and distinguishable pure row strategy for each of the three level-n archetypes we consider (specifically, games 2, 4, 7, 11, 13; Fig. 2 ). That is, each of the five games had a unique symmetric 5 pure Nash 5 Given that players are matched against the choice distribution of others (a procedure known as meanmatching), two-player asymmetric Nash equilibria are no longer equilibria in the mean-matching game. The unique Nash equilibrium of each of the mean-matching games considered in this work is the symmetric pure Nash equilibrium. equilibrium action, a unique level-1 action, and a unique level-2 action; all of which were distinct from each other. Only data on these five games will be analyzed here.
In the second experiment, 24 symmetric 3 × 3 games were selected which satisfied certain properties: As in the chosen games from SW's experiment, each game matrix had unique and distinct Nash equilibrium, level-1, and level-2 actions. Each matrix cell contained a number from 0 to 99 where each matrix had one cell containing 0 and one cell containing 99. For game matrices 1 to 19, the hypothetical token payoff for any of the hypothesized archetypes for choosing his or her best response strategy was at least 20 tokens greater than his or her hypothetical payoff to any other strategy. Game matrices 20 to 24 are identical to the five game matrices analyzed from the first experiment. The game matrices for the second experiment are in Fig. 3. 
Experimental Considerations: Can Beliefs Be Captured?
There are two debated issues in experimental methodology with direct relevance to the techniques employed in the second experiment. The first regards the incentive structure used to induce accurate belief disclosure by participants. The second raises the possibility that individuals may not even be capable of explicitly quantifying their beliefs.
Normally in applications requiring belief disclosure, scoring rules are used to generate truthfulness and accuracy in reported beliefs. Two commonly used scoring rules are the quadratic rule (DeFinetti, 1965; Murphy & Winkler, 1970) and the logarithmic rule (Shuford, Albert, & Massengill, 1966) . The essential element of a good scoring rule is that it punishes responses which deviate from the individual's optimal response given his or her true belief.
We argue that the incentive structure used in games 1-19 of the second experiment meets the essential criteria for a scoring rule. Though the payoff rule used is flat in the immediate neighborhood of any prior, the steep payoff difference of at least 20 tokens (42.84 is the average difference; 34 is the median difference) between the ''neighborhoods'' 6 serves as a strong inducement to report one's belief with 6 The neighborhood of a level-n hypothesis in which one's payoff is flat is roughly one third of the hypothesis space if the actual choice distribution is the same as the hypothesized one. reasonable precision.
Though we acknowledge that one's state of mind prior to making a choice may not be able to manifest itself in the form of a quantitative hypothesis, we are nonetheless interested in those types that make the kind of calculations that must be made consciously. In the second experiment, by forcing players to best respond to some hypothesis, we hoped to capture with less error the hypotheses of those players who make a conscious calculation in some form or another.
DATA
The data used in the analysis of this paper are the hypotheses entered by players. We study the two data sets described in 3.1. One is SW's, of which we look at the five games that distinguish the three archetypal actions, and the other with 19 additional games and a modified experimental procedure.
Two restrictions were imposed on observations in both data sets to be included in the analysis: (1) The hypothesis by any player for any game must be consistent with the final choice entered by the player for that game, and (2) only the last hypothesis (that satisfied the first condition) by a given player for a given game was admissible.
Recall that in the first data set, the SW data, players were not required to enter hypotheses. If a player entered no hypothesis for a given game, his or her hypothesis for that game was treated as a missing value. Similarly, if a player entered hypotheses for a game, but none were consistent with the final choice, his or her hypothesis for that game was treated as a missing value. Of 153 missing values in the SW data, 122 resulted from no hypotheses, and only 31 resulted from hypotheses inconsistent with the final choice for a given game by a given player. The imposition of these restrictions on the hypothesis data set for the SW experiment presents three shortcomings: (1) fewer observations, (2) a potential selection bias, and (3) a potentially inadequate incentive structure for the extraction of beliefs (recall the discussion in Section 3.2).
The second experiment was intended to remedy these shortcomings. For the second data set, we have observations on hypotheses for 22 players over 24 games. In this data set, three players consistently selected the maximax hypothesis over games. By maximax hypothesis, we define any hypothesis which puts a probability greater than 0.8 on the column containing the maximax payoff (in our games, this is always the column containing the 99 payoff). The maximax archetype is outside the scope of this paper and cannot be captured by the analysis at hand. We therefore remove these players from the sample. We are left with 19 players over 24 games, or 456 observations; enough to produce a sufficiently small mean squared error. This new data set is also superior due to no missing hypotheses, thus minimizing the potential for selection bias. Moreover, as discussed in Section 3.2, the steep payoff differences mitigate the potential inadequacy of the belief extraction incentive structure in the first experiment.
Elements of each hypothesis vector had to be rearranged for the purpose of this paper so that hypothesis vectors from different choice matrices can be compared. In the new arrangement, p 1 , the first element of the hypothesis vector, is the probability assigned to the action corresponding to level-1 behavior. Similarly, p 2 , the second element of the hypothesis vector, is the probability assigned to the action corresponding to level-2 behavior. Last, p 3 , is the probability assigned to the action corresponding to Nash equilibrium behavior.
One could deduce some players' types without a great deal of analysis. For example, in the second data set, three players entered the type 1 hypothesis more than 14 times. Three players entered the type 2 hypothesis more than 16 times, and four players entered the Nash hypothesis more than 12 times. However, to classify the rest of the players this way could be misleading at best.
Given that the elements of each vector are linearly dependent, we ignore the redundant third element in each vector and our data are reduced to two-dimensional observations. This corresponds to a right triangle in the positive quadrant or an equilateral triangle plane in three dimensions as shown in Fig. 4 .
We plot both data sets in two dimensions (Figs. 5 and 6). We observe that the data make the rough shape of a right triangle, corresponding to the three boundaries p 1 =0, p 2 =0, and p 1 +p 2 =1. We further note that the data are not uniformly distributed on the space and that there are clusters of data points in it. Many of the data points lie on or close to one or more of the three boundaries. This presents a problem, as we explain in Section 5.2.
FIG. 4. An equilateral triangle plane in three dimensions.
FIG. 5.
A two-dimensional scatter-plot of the data: First data set.
FIG. 6.
A two-dimensional scatter-plot of the data: Second data set.
MODES IN BELIEFS
STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY
The Kernel Density Estimate
The analysis to follow is a nonparametric analysis, based on kernel density estimation. We begin the description of our methodology with a quick description of the kernel density estimate. Given an independent sample of d-dimensional observations X 1 , ..., X n from a multivariate density f, define a kernel density estimate by
where K(u) is a d-dimensional Kernel function. We limit the scope of this paper to kernels which satisfy the moment conditions > K(t) dt=1 and > tK(t) dt=1. The first moment condition ensures that the estimated density integrates to one on its domain and hence is a valid density. The second condition ensures that the bias is of order h
2
. The parameter h is called the window size or bandwidth and determines the amount of smoothing that is applied to the data.
Three Boundaries in Two Dimensions
As is apparent in Figs. 5 and 6, the data analyzed in this paper fall within a right triangle, implying the three boundaries p 1 =0, p 2 =0, and p 1 +p 2 =1. Since a substantial portion of our data falls on or near these boundaries, a boundary correction is necessary. Essentially the problem at or near the boundary is that the curve to be estimated has a discontinuity at an endpoint, so that the usual bias expansion, which depends on smoothness assumptions, cannot be carried out. To tackle the boundary problem, we pursue two alternatives. First, we apply the reflection technique, attributed to Shuster (1985) . This technique has the data reflected about all boundary hyperplanes, creating symmetric images of observations. The reflection of our triangular space is done into 18 different similarly shaped spaces as shown in Fig. 7 . In conjunction with the reflection technique we select the common multivariate Gaussian kernel. As an alternative, we look at a boundary kernel approach. We adopt Scott's (1992, p. 146) designer biweight kernel, together with reflection only about the diagonal boundary.
Bootstrap Tests
One of the important concerns in this work is with the statistical significance of modes. Silverman (1981) suggested and illustrated a way that kernel probability density estimates can be used to investigate the number of modes in the density underlying a given independent identically distributed real sample. Silverman's test is the most commonly used test for the number of modes and is based on ''critically smoothed bandwidths.'' Consider the problem of testing the null hypothesis that the density f has k (or fewer) modes against the alternative that f has more than k modes.
Let ĥ k be the k-critical bandwidth, i.e., the smallest value of h such that f (x, h) has k modes. A large value of ĥ k relative to ĥ k+1 indicates that much smoothing is needed to create an estimated density with only k modes. Hence, a large ĥ k is evidence against H 0 . Silverman's bootstrap procedure for assessing the significance of an observed value of ĥ k is based on the achieved significance level. The algorithm for assessing the P-value of ĥ k is to generate a large number of samples from f ( · , ĥ k ) and to count the proportion of samples which yield a density estimate with k modes or more using window width ĥ k .
In contrast to the global testing approach, a local testing procedure is particularly useful when knowing which modes are ''real'' is more important than the actual number of modes. Local tests also allow the use of location information as well as bandwidth adaptivity. Adaptivity can be crucial when modes occur on peaks of varying sizes, as the peaks may be poorly estimated using nonadaptive fixedbandwidth kernel density estimation. In a local mode test, a different fixedbandwidth is used for the testing of each mode. In this way one can gain the benefits of locality and increase power by using location information.
In Minnotte's (1997) local test, the test statistic for a given mode is the maximal excess mass difference-the minimal distance of the estimated density at the critical bandwidth for that particular mode from the set of continuous functions without a local maximum in a local neighborhood of the mode.
We must, of course, make a choice for the bandwidth at which the test statistic will be calculated. Assign all modes the index i=1, 2, ..., indicating the order of their appearance. Let h test, i denote the bandwidth at which mode m i splits. At this bandwidth, the mode m i will have its highest mass. The test statistic M i =M(m i ) denotes the excess mass of mode m i at bandwidth h test, i .
The bootstrap procedure follows Silverman (1981) , except in the choice of bootstrap density. Here, to conform to the null hypothesis, the tested density f i is adjusted by moving part of the probability mass of the mode m i into the surrounding valleys until no modes are present in the region of interest. Hence, the null representative density f i equals f everywhere outside the adjacent modes. Given the null representative density f i , new samples of size n are drawn from f i .
After the jth bootstrap sample is drawn, a new density estimate f j i is calculated using the same bandwidth h test, i . The modes of f and f j i are then matched. To be conservative, we match the largest mode of the bootstrap sample in the region of interest with the mode in question of the original sample. This mode is then measured with a test statistic calculated as above. To do that, we decrease the bandwidth to the point before the mode splits and take its excess mass there to be the bootstrap test statistic for sample j, denoted M j i .
RESULTS
Mode test results for both data sets, using the procedures described in this paper, 7 produce strong evidence to support modes corresponding to level-1, level-2, 7 The detailed mechanics of the procedures applied here are available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/ eharuvy/modes_app.doc. and level-3 behaviors. We also find evidence for the existence of a Nash behavioral type and some evidence for the existence of a hybrid type, consistent with SW's worldly archetype.
Applying the boundary biweight kernel approach to the global mode test, we find that, within a reasonable range of bandwidths, 8 only the null hypothesis of six 8 By a ''reasonable range of bandwidths,'' we mean the range of bandwidths for which the unmodified kernel's support would not intersect both boundaries at the same time; i.e., bandwidths smaller than 0.5.
modes cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level (see Tables 1a and 1b) . The six modes identified by the boundary biweight method are roughly the same for the two data sets (see Fig. 8 ). Four of these six modes correspond to level-1, level-2, level-3, and Nash behaviors. Recall from Section 4 that the hypothesis data were rearranged such that the first element of each hypothesis vector was the probability assigned to the action corresponding to level-1 action, the second was the probability assigned to the level-2 action, and the third was probability assigned to the Nash action. One mode was found at (0.5, 0.0, 0.5), which fits the behavior assigned by SW to the hybrid worldly type. The last mode found was at (0.0, 0.5, 0.5). This last mode does not correspond to any existing theoretical model of prior formation.
Applying the Gaussian reflection procedure to the first data set, we cannot reject the null hypotheses of 1, 2, 3, or 4 modes at the 5% significance level. All other null hypotheses can be rejected. The Gaussian reflection method in the second data set rejects 1, 2, and 3 modes at the 5% significance level but cannot reject 4, 5, 6, or 7 modes (see Tables 1a and 1b ). The modes corresponding to levels 1, 2, and 3 are included in the group of identified modes under all non-rejected null hypotheses. The Nash mode is not rejected in the second data set but is absent under all nonrejected null hypotheses in the first data set.
From an experimental design point of view, the second data set is the more reliable data set, since the second experiment was specifically designed to extract beliefs (as discussed in Section 3.2). However, there are indications of greater noise in that -value=0.086 data set. First, both density estimation procedures in the second data set produced the mode we associate with level-1 behavior at roughly (0.43, 0.28, 0.29) , whereas the hypothesized level-1 mode (closely identified in the first data set) is at (0.33, 0.33, 0.33) . Second, the P-value for the hypothesis of six modes (which was the only null hypothesis not rejected by the boundary biweight procedure) in the second data set was less than half the P-value of the first data set for that null (0.215 versus 0.075). Third, the magnitude of the Nash mode is substantially larger in the second data set, alerting us to a potential difference between the two sets of games used in the two experiments. The reason could be that in the second experiment, 10 out of 24 games had the Nash strategy coinciding with the maximax strategy (namely, games 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 16, 19 in Fig. 3 ). This feature would make the Nash strategy stand out in contrast to other strategies. As discussed in Section 4, the maximax behavior is not captured in the density estimation and hence can potentially generate a great deal of noise. The games in the first experiment did not have the maximax action coinciding with the Nash action.
Eliminating the problematic 10 games from our second data set, we get strikingly similar results to those obtained from the first data set: Our P-value for the null hypothesis of six modes in the reduced data set is now 0.215 (identical to 0.215 in the first data set). Our level-1 mode is now (0.3375, 0.3375, 0.325) using the boundary biweight kernel method and (0.35, 0.35, 0.30) using the Gaussian reflection method, compared to the ideal (0.333, 0.333, 0.333) and to (0.3375, 0.3375, 0.325) identified in the first data set. Though the Nash mode still appears, it is now substantially smaller in magnitude.
The above second data subset cannot reject the null hypothesis of six modes under either estimation method. The six modes found are virtually identical to the six modes we concluded for the complete data sets (Table 1c) . A visual comparison of the six modes found for each set, using the different techniques, is available in Figs. 8 and 9 .
Examination of each mode individually was achieved by the local mode test described in Section 5.3. Given the increased importance of monotonicity in local testing, we use the Gaussian kernel for this purpose, combined with the reflection method. We conduct the test on our most reliable data set-the subset of the second data set constructed above. The local mode test results for this data subset are in Table 2 . The null hypothesis that the level-1 mode does not exist can be rejected at all significance levels. Furthermore, the level-1 mode has the largest excess mass, with excess mass at 50% of the entire probability mass. The null hypothesis that the Nash mode does not exist can also be rejected at all significance levels. This mode has an excess mass of 1.5% of the entire probability mass. The corresponding levels of significance for the level-2 and level-3 modes are 6.5% and 15%, respectively. Excess masses for these modes were both at roughly 1% of the probability mass. The null that the worldly mode (0.5, 0.0, 0.5) does not exist can be rejected at the 8% level. It has an excess mass of less than one third of a percent of the entire probability mass. The null that the (0.0, 0.5, 0.5) mode does not exist cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level and has an excess mass of less than one thousandth of a percent of the entire probability mass.
CONCLUSION
It has been generally evident in experimental works that human subjects do not always begin with Nash equilibrium beliefs. One proposed alternative to the Nash model of beliefs is to allow different depths of reasoning. Such approach was shown empirically salient by Stahl (1993) and Nagel (1995) . Subsequent works established that the original findings were remarkably robust to many beauty contest variations and settings as well as to a large class of normal form games.
Whereas depths of reasoning classification in beauty contest games is relatively simple through mode analysis, such methods are not easily extendable to other types of games, such as normal form games. Consequently, empirical works by Stahl and coauthors and by Costa-Gomes et al. (in press ) relied on parametric likelihood-based methods that used data only on actions and essentially abandoned data on hypotheses. Though level-n characterization of belief structures has been shown to be successful in such approaches, parametric models, by virtue of being sensitive to specification, could be misleading. It was hence of great importance to examine hypothesis data to see if the findings of parametric analysis of actions were confirmed. The approach presented here and the findings are therefore a useful contribution to the literature on depths of reasoning.
In this article, the data were player hypotheses rather than player choices. No parametric models were specified. A density measure over beliefs was constructed and modes in it were located and tested for statistical significance. Given the common interpretation that each significant mode corresponds to a subpopulation of players, our results strongly suggest the existence of level-n subpopulations in the population distribution of beliefs.
The relative strengths of the modes tend to suggest that despite any possible contamination by various idiosyncratic behaviors, these modes are real. Else, one would expect the relative strengths of these modes to change across data sets and subsets of games in the same sample.
The level-1 mode is the strongest mode for all data sets and density estimation techniques as measured by both excess mass and P-value. The excess mass of the level-1 mode is 50% of the entire probability mass. The next mode in the ranking has excess mass that is 1.5% of the probability mass. This leaves little doubt the level-1 mode is real. In contrast, the (0, 0.5, 0.5) prior (the only mode found not supported by level-n theory) is the weakest mode found as measured by both excess mass and P-value.
The methods discussed and modifications developed here for these methods make possible the identification of modes of behavior in a variety of experimental and real world settings. Such identification would allow the use of heterogeneity in economic modeling in fields where, due to lack of proper tools for identification of sub-populations, representative agent assumptions dominate.
The particular application of heterogeneity investigated in this paper, namely level-n theory, has far-reaching implications as well. The significant evidence found in favor of level-n modes, in particular the substantial evidence found in favor of level-1 behavior, suggests incorporating these types of behavior into the empirical characterization of play in any behavioral model allowing for heterogeneity in behavior. Further research by this author investigates the predictive power of level-n theory in settings involving multiple equilibria.
